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CASE COMMENT

EQUAL PROTECTION FOR SUBSTANTIVE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM*

Respondents were dismissed from positions as drug rehabilitation counselors because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a Native
American Church ceremony.' They were subsequently denied unemployment
benefits when the state Employment Division (petitioner) determined that
their discharge was due to work-related "misconduct."2 The Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the denial of benefits was a violation of
respondents' First Amendment right to free exercise of their religion.3 On
appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the payment of benefits, reasoning
that the purpose of the "misconduct" provision of the statute governing unemployment compensation was not to enforce the state's criminal code, but
rather to preserve the financial stability of the compensation fund.' The Oregon court held that the denial of benefits imposed a significant burden on the
respondents' religious freedom, and the state's financial interest was not
sufficiently compelling to justify penalizing religiously motivated conduct.'
Petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court, maintaining that the
illegality of respondents' conduct was relevant to their constitutional claim.'
The Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the Oregon court to determine the legality of religious use of peyote under either statutory exemption
or case law.' On remand, the Oregon court found that a number of other
states and the federal government provide exceptions for religiously motivat-

*

This comment received the Huber Hurst Award for the outstanding case comment submitted in the

Spring 1993 semester.
1. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). The supervisor had advised respondent
(Smith) that he would be permitted to attend the religious ceremony but should he participate, respondent
would lose his job. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 446 (Or. 1986).

2. Smith. 494 U.S. at 874. Respondents' employer, the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT), required as a matter of policy that its counselors abstain
completely from using alcohol or nonprescription drugs. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 662
n.3 (1988). In this footnote, the Court cites to ADAPT's policy statement regarding employment conditions: "Use of an illegal drug or use of prescription drugs in a nonprescribed manner is grounds for immediate termination from employment." Id.
3. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
4. Smith, 721 P.2d at 450-51.
5.
6.
7.
entitled

Id. at 450.
Smith, 485 U.S. at 662.
Id. at 673-74. The Court stated that it would be erroneous to hold that the respondents' conduct is
to the "same measure of federal constitutional protection regardless of its criminality." Id.
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ed use of peyote,' but that the Oregon statute "makes no exception for the
sacramental use of peyote."9 However, the court also reaffirmed its holding
that the First Amendment prevented the state from enforcing its prohibitions
against peyote use by members of the Native American Church.'" The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari and HELD, because the use
of peyote was prohibited under state law, and because that prohibition is
constitutional, the state may deny unemployment compensation to persons
whose dismissal results from use of the drug without violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
The Bill of Rights declares: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ... " Yet
many laws do limit the free exercise of religion by prohibiting some conduct
required by the religion or requiring some conduct proscribed by the religion." The challenge for the Court has been to decide when religious free
exercise has been restricted, what standard of review to apply, and how to
balance competing claims of government requirements with individual religious freedom.' 4
In the first free exercise challenge, Reynolds v. United States,'5 the
Court began its inquiry by attempting to define what religious freedom has
been guaranteed. 6 The case involved a member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) who was charged with violating criminal laws against polygamy. 7 The Mormon church at that time not only
condoned but encouraged polygamy." The petitioner therefore urged that
members should be exempt from the statute because polygamy was part of
8. Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146. 148-49 (Or. 1988). The Oregon court noted that the
legislative history of the federal Drug Abuse Control amendments (on which the state statutes are based)
indicates Congress expressly approved the exemption of the sacramental use of peyote in the Native
American Church. Id. The court also cited a California case which extensively detailed the history and
ceremony of the peyote rite and the beneficial effects the religion has shown on curbing alcohol and drug
abuse among its practitioners. Id. (citing People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964)).
9. Id. at 148.
10. Id. at 150. It is conceivable that the Oregon court was attempting to carve out a judicial exemption
as the California court had done in Woody, 394 P.2d at 813.
11. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The Free Exercise Clause was extended to the states by incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). While the Cantwell
Court did not specify a test, it indicated that the power to regulate religiously motivated action must be
exercised so as not to unduly infringe the protected freedom. Id. at 304.
13. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
14. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the
Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672 (1992) (describing the Court's effort to unite on a workable
approach to the Religion Clauses as an "erratic path").
15. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 145.
18. Id. at 161. Church doctrine held that it was the duty of male members to practice polygamy and
that failure to do so would be punished. Id.
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Mormon religious practice. 9 Citing to the writings of Thomas Jefferson, the
Court reasoned that the government may not interfere with "mere religious
belief and opinions,"2 but was free to legislate actions which were "in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."'" To allow an exemption in this case would grant religious doctrine a position superior to the law
of the land, and "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist in name only in such circumstances."22 Thus, under
Reynolds the Free Exercise Clause provided unrestricted liberty of belief, but
virtually no constitutional protection for conduct motivated by that belief.
The Reynolds formulation held for nearly a century, until an association
of Jewish merchants challenged Sunday closing laws as a restriction of their
free exercise rights.23 In Braunfeld v. Brown, the merchants claimed that
because their religion prohibited labor on their Sabbath, which was Saturday,
and the state required them to close their shops on Sunday, they were forced
to forego a full business day which was available to their competitors.24 The
state's law thus penalized them for observing the commands of their religion.
Although the Court upheld the Sunday closing law and held that economic
burden was not a sufficient prohibition of their free exercise rights, it also
indicated a new standard of review was to be applied to free exercise challenges.25 While applying "the most critical scrutiny" to laws which only
19. Id. at 161-62.
20. Id. at 162. The Court here lays a dubious foundation both for the Reynolds decision and for subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court acknowledged that Jefferson was out of the country, and
therefore was not a participant in the ratification process of either the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 163. Nonetheless, the Court accepted a letter Jefferson wrote during his presidency as an "authoritative declaration" of the scope of the First Amendment. Id. at 164. More appropriate sources of interpretation have been available in the legislative debates recorded in the Annals of Congress and in the writings
of Madison as chief author and sponsor of the amendment. Jefferson's letter, with its "misleading [wall of
separation] metaphor" was thus a "less than ideal source" of the Amendment's meaning. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) (describing the debates in the first congress, the free exercise provisions of each of the state constitutions, and
contrasting Jefferson's and Madison's views of religion). However, both Reynolds and Jefferson's letter
were adopted by the Court as precedent and as authoritative interpretation for both religion clauses. This
adoption has had far reaching implications for subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence, as the Court
itself has noted on several occasions. Constructing doctrine around the "wall" has contributed to the "erratic path," Glendon, supra note 14, and the interpretive problems described infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
21. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. The Court expanded this reasoning in a later case involving a Mormon
who was denied the right to vote because of his religion. The Court stated that the exercise of religion
"must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country" and noted that the laws of a society are "designed to secure its peace, prosperity, and the morals of its people." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 34243 (1890). This holding directly contradicts the role Madison gave religion. See infra note 73.
22. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
23. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
24. Id. at 601-02. The statute at issue was enacted in 1959. Prior to that time the merchants had routinely opened on Sunday, doing a substantial amount of business. Braunfeld claimed that the prohibition
cost him enough business that it would cause his store to fail. Id.
25. Id. at 606. Although it had not fomulated a test, the Court had previously indicated a higher
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indirectly burden religious exercise would restrict the latitude of legislatures, 2 6 if the purpose or effect of a law is "to impede the observance of one
or all religions or is to discriminate" between them, the law is unconstitutional even though the burden is only an indirect one." The test which
emerged from Braunfeld is: (1) does the law burden religion either directly
or indirectly and (2) if so, can the valid secular purpose be accomplished by
a less restrictive means?"
This standard was successfully expanded and applied to free exercise
claims in a line of unemployment compensation cases, beginning with
Sherbert v. Verner.29 In Sherbert, the petitioner, a Seventh Day Adventist,
was fired from her job when she refused to work on Saturday because it was
her church's Sabbath. 0 She sought and was denied unemployment compensation because she refused "available work" offered to her by the unemployment office as those positions also would require her to work on Saturday.3
The Court applied the compelling state interest test noting that: "It is basic
that no showing of merely a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible
limitation."32 Finding no such abuse or danger, the Court held that the state
could not condition the availability of benefits on the claimant's willingness
to violate a cardinal principle of her religion. 3 To do so "effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties," and is the functional
equivalent of a fine on her worship.'

standard of review would be appropriate to protect "discrete and insular minorities," including religious
minorities. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also supra note 12.
Braunfeld was the first to define the test and apply it to a religion case. Braunfeld. 366 U.S. at 613
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
27. Id. at 607.
28. Id.
29. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981). Outside of the unemployment compensation context, the Free Exercise Clause has also
been successfully used to challenge state compulsory education laws. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (Amish children exempted from the state's compulsory education law requiring attendance
through the tenth grade, which was in conflict with Amish practice of leaving the secular school system
after the eighth grade).
30. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 399, n.l. Petitioner's employment at the textile mill and her membership in
the church predate the mill's change to a six-day work-week. The evidence presented also indicated that
Sunday worshippers would not be similarly prejudiced were the mill required to change to a seven-day
week in the event of a national emergency. Id. at 406.
31. Id. at 400-01.
32. Id. at 406.
33. Id. at 410.
34. Id. at 404, 406. The difference between Braunfeld and Sherbert may be the degree of economic
disadvantage inflicted upon the respective parties by the state. Both involved a religious injunction against
Saturday labor; however, the merchants in Braunfeld were only required to give up one day of business,
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The heightened scrutiny which emerged from Braunfeld foreshadowed
the application of compelling state interest in Sherbert. The two-step analysis
required the individual claiming infringement to show that the law as applied
burdened the free exercise of religion, and then once the burden threshold
had been crossed, for the state to show a compelling interest in general application of the law.35 Still undefined was the threshold level of burden: mere
economic disadvantage was insufficient, but denial of a generally available
entitlement such as unemployment compensation triggered the second part of
the test. Also undefined was the weight to be given the government interest
when balanced against the burden imposed.
The Court retreated from free exercise exemptions with two cases involving Native Americans who claimed that government actions infringed on
their free exercise rights. 6 The second of these cases, Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, challenged a logging road to be built over
federal land which was also sacred worship grounds used by three Native
American tribes.37 While the Lyng Court found that the road and consequent
logging activity would have a devastating impact on the religious practices of
the tribes, it also held that government actions should not be conditioned by
religious objections.38 The burden threshold had been met, but the Court
found that the effected individuals would not be coerced into violating their
beliefs by the government's action.39 Rather than define a level of government interest which would outweigh the burden, since the burden in this case
was the virtual destruction of the religion, the Court substituted a coercion

whereas Sherbert was denied both her job and unemployment compensation benefits. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
399-401; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601, 609.
35. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 403, 406.
36. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (involving a Native American who claimed that the
government's use of social security numbers in administering the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) program violated his religious belief that use of the numbers would steal his daughter's
soul). The Court in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n builds on a line of reasoning
advanced in Roy, which held that while the government's action might interfere significantly with the
individual's religious beliefs, government need not conduct its own internal affairs to comport with the
religious beliefs of its citizens. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448 (citing Roy. 476 U.S. at 699-700). Lyng appears to
have the greater impact, and for this reason will be the only case discussed in detail on this point.
37. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). A U.S. Forest Service environmental impact study concluded that the road
would cause "serious and irreparable" damage to the Native Americans' religious practice. Id. at 442.
38. Id. at 451. Respondents also depended on the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA),
enacted in August 1978 as 42 U.S.C.S. § 1996 (Law. Co-op. 1989). With AIRFA, Congress declared that
the policy of the United States was to preserve and protect Native American religious freedom, including
the right to believe and exercise their religions through traditional ceremonies and rites, and to have access
to sites and possession of sacred objects. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1996 (Law Co-op. 1989). The Court, however,
referred to the legislative history of the Act to determine that it was policy only, and was passed with no
intent to create a cause of action, judicially enforceable rights, or to confer any special religious rights on
Native Americans. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455. Effectively, AIRFA "has no teeth in it." Id.
39. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. While government may accommodate religious practices by allowing the
tribes to use the land for their ceremonies, the right of religious free exercise cannot be construed to divest
the government of the right to use its own land. Id.
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test. "Incidental effects" of lawful government actions which do not penalize
religion or coerce individuals to act contrary to their beliefs, even though
such actions may make it more difficult to practice certain religions, do not
require the government to show a compelling justification.'
The instant case, on the surface, would appear to be another in the line
of unemployment compensation cases. Indeed, that is how the case was first
presented.4 ' In the alternative, it could be analyzed as a claim for a religious
exemption from generally applicable statutes. 2 The respondents requested
the government to consider the unique practices of the Native American
Church: to outlaw the use of peyote is to destroy the practice of the
church.43 This alternative is the method the instant Court chose to follow:
when remanding the case to the Oregon Supreme Court, the question to be
resolved was whether the state allowed an exemption for sacramental peyote
use either by statute or case law." The Court reasoned that if the respondents could be held criminally liable for their conduct, then the state could
impose the lesser penalty of denying unemployment benefits.45
While the Oregon court on remand found no statutory exemption for
sacramental peyote use, it also found that the criminal provisions were irrelevant to the case at bar. The case should instead be analyzed under the unemployment compensation regulations, thus bringing it in line with Sherbert.'
The instant Court, however, distinguished Sherbert and its progeny from the
instant case by observing that the conduct at issue was not prohibited by
state criminal statutes.47 Citing to Reynolds among others, the instant Court
stated it had "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the
State is free to regulate."4 The Court noted that Oregon's drug laws are not
specifically targeted toward religious use, and are therefore neutral laws of
general applicability. For these laws, only a rational basis test is necessary.49
Having confined the compelling interest test to a narrow fact situation,
the instant Court then stated that prior free exercise claims have been sus-

40. Id. at 450-51.
41. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
42. Id. at 897.
43. Id. at 919.
44. Id. at 875.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 875. Oregon had not attempted to enforce the criminal prohibition of peyote use against the
respondents, nor did the petitioner rely on the criminal statutes in defending the denial of benefits in the
state court. Id. at 909 n.2 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
47. Id. at 876. Justice O'Connor's separate opinion disputes this distinction, stating that the Sherbert
test applies in both criminal and civil cases. Id. at 898 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The
compulsory education statute at issue in Yoder provided criminal sanctions for failure to comply. Yoder,
406 U.S. at 206.
48. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
49. Id. at 885-87.
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tained against generally applicable laws only in conjunction with some other
claimed constitutional right such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
or parents' rights to control their children's upbringing.50 The instant case
did not present such a "hybrid situation," there is therefore no additional
claimed right for the respondents to fall back on.5 ' Further, the Court states
that the compelling interest test, if applied to the instant case as it is applied
in other fields, would produce a "constitutional anomaly."52 Because of the
diversity of beliefs present in modem society, the Court "cannot afford the
luxury" of applying a compelling interest test to every regulation of
conduct.53
The majority determined that the protection of religious liberty under the
First Amendment does not require the strict scrutiny of judicial review.'
Since only a rational basis test is required, the Court then delegated the protection of religious freedom to the political process.55 Overtly discriminatory
laws are not permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.5 The Court is
concerned here with neutral, generally applicable laws. While not constitutionally required, statutory religious exemptions are constitutionally permissible.57 The Court recognizes that leaving accommodation to the legislatures
will place minority religions at a "relative disadvantage;" however, according
to the majority, this disadvantage is preferable to judges weighing the importance of all laws against religious belief.58
The impact of the instant case then is not in the holding, which is consistent with the line of cases governing religiously-motivated criminal conduct,59 but in its reasoning. The dissent describes the effect of the decision

50. Id. at 881.
51. Id. at 882.
52. Id. at 886. The anomaly would be a private right to ignore generally applicable laws. Id.
53. Id. at 888.
54. Id. at 889. This conclusion stands contrary to the premise on which Justice Scalia based his dissent a year earlier, noting that the Constitution provides for the "discriminatory protection of freedom of
religion." Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
56. Id. at 894. However, as at least one commentator has observed, a requirement of only equal protection-like neutrality renders the Free Exercise Clause functionally meaningless. See, e.g., Stephen L.
Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L.
REV. 265, 294 (1982).
57. Smith. 494 U.S. at 890. One commonly cited example of a legislative exemption is the one granted to the Catholic Church to use wine for Mass during the Prohibition Era. The religious use of peyote
has been compared to the use of wine in the Christian communion sacrament. Id. at 913 n.6 (Blackmun,
J.,
dissenting); see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUp. CT. REV. 1, 50-51
(arguing that statutes are "riddled with exemptions" for a variety of secular groups and interests, failure to
make similar exemptions for religion amounts to hostile indifference).
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. This effectively abdicates the Court's traditional role of protecting minority rights from infringing majoritarian legislation. See infra note 76.
59. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J..concurring). Justice O'Connor would arrive at the same
result applying the compelling interest standard. Id. at 903-07.
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as a "wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of
our Constitution."' The Court has lowered the standard of review from a
showing of compelling state interest to a showing only that the law is neutral
and of general applicability. In effect, the Court's treatment of free exercise
claims has come full circle back to Reynolds: 61 one may believe unrestrained by law, but the state may regulate conduct so long as it has a rational basis for doing so. This result, according to the majority, is based on the
record of more than a century of First Amendment jurisprudence.62
However, as the dissent points out, the majority reaches this conclusion
'
"only by mischaracterizing this Court's precedents."63
The separate concurring opinion states that the Court has not only strained the reading of the
First Amendment, but disregarded "consistent application of free exercise
doctrine."' Commentary has been equally harsh, characterizing the Court's
use of precedent as "transparently dishonest. 65 One commentator who
agreed with the decision stated that the opinion showed only a "shallow
understanding of free exercise jurisprudence," and that the Court's use of
precedent "borders on fiction."' Another stated that the primary precedent
relied on by the majority to support its decision "consists entirely of overruled and minority opinions. '67 These inconsistencies are thoroughly examined elsewhere.'

60. Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 881. Indeed, the majority states that Reynolds controls. This is a curious choice of controlling precedent since its central premise, the speech-action dichotomy, was repudiated in Cantwell, and the
instant Court recognized that "exercise" also includes conduct. Moreover, Reynolds predates the test which
had been applied for thirty years, and foreshadowed even earlier. See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304;
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
62. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
63. Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Laycock, supra note 57, at 3. To illustrate the point, Laycock quotes Justice Scalia in two opinions only 14 months apart. Citing to the Sherbert line, Scalia stated that "we held that the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment required religious beliefs to be accommodated by granting religion-specific
exemptions from otherwise applicable laws." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare the previous statement with Scalia's majority opinion in Smith: "We have never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct
that the state is free to regulate." Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
66. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308,
309 (1991). Professor Marshall defends Smith's rejection of free exercise exemptions because exemptions
require that the courts define the values of the belief systems involved and then weigh those values
against the interests of the state, but Marshall does not defend the decision itself.
67. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv.
1109, 1125 (1990). Some of the cases to which McConnell refers include Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145 (noting that the speech-action dichotomy central to Reynolds was repudiated by Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)); and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (attacking the majority's use of the compelling interest test). Other cases
cited include two which were decided prior to the introduction of the compelling interest test.
68. See, e.g., Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Smith 494 U.S. at 891-901; Laycock, supra note
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By returning to Reynolds as the standard, the Court makes it possible for
legislative action to effectively prohibit religious exercise without providing
the believer with any judicial recourse.69 One who is barred from religiously-motivated conduct is effectively prohibited from exercising the religion
itself.70 The results are likely to fall hardest on minority beliefs with little
effective voice in the political process as the majority is in a position to
ensure that its beliefs will be accommodated. Lawmakers and even judges
often do not know or understand the impact of laws or other government
actions on minority religions.7 The harshness of this delegation to the legislative process is revealed in the majority's reading of the text of the First
Amendment: if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object, but
"merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."72
The majority's characterization of what will offend the First Amendment
ignores the plain language of the text: the language clearly makes one's free
exercise of religion a preferred constitutional activity rather than an "anomaly."73 The First Amendment makes no distinction between belief and conduct. The history of religious persecution and intolerance endured by many
of the early colonists led to the inclusion of the First Amendment in the
Constitution. Freedom of religion was to the founders an "essential element
of liberty." 74 Mere facial neutrality is therefore insufficient protection, be58, at 2-3; McConnell, supra note 67, at 1114-27.
69. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102
HARV. L. REV. 933, 938 (1989). The Reynolds view of free exercise permitted no exemptions for religiously motivated action, so long as the prohibition at issue advanced a secular policy. The burden concept and compelling interest test developed when Reynolds proved inadequate and subsequent case law
developments began to erode its principle. See supra notes 12, 25.
70. Smith, 494 U.S. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 passim
(1992). Neutrality can easily cross the line to indifference, discrimination, or even hostility if religious
groups have only the non-reviewable political process as protection. Many see the role of the Religion
Clauses as protecting society from religion rather than the reverse as the founders intended. See also
Glendon, supra note 14, at 677, 682.
72. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
73. Id. at 901, 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 52. The Court has traditionally been the
refuge of the minority against majority oppression. Considering the place of religion in American society,
where current polls indicate that the majority of people identify with some religious practice, it is curious
that the Court would abdicate this judicial role. See also Glendon, supra note 14. at 673. Citing to a recent survey, Professor Glendon notes that most Americans rank free exercise of religion "exactly where
the Framers of the Bill of Rights put it"-first, with freedom of speech a very close second.
74. Smith, 494 U.S. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For discussion of the place of religion in American life both in the founders' time and currently, see generally GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION
AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1990) and DANIEL DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW (1987).
Many of the original colonies were established specifically to escape the religious intolerance prevalent in
Europe. When the Constitution was being debated, then, most of the states recommended a provision for
religious liberty be included, and two (Virginia and North Carolina) expressly conditioned their ratification
upon such provision. Wills cites to Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, wherein Madison defined
religion as the "duty owed towards the Creator." Further, the order of that duty is "precedent, both in
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cause "laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties" as readily as laws
which are actually discriminatory." As Justice Douglas noted in Sherbert,
requiring a believer in a minority faith to "conform to the scruples of the
majority" can suppress the minority faith under the guise of 'police' or
'health' regulations reflecting the majority's views7 6 Such constraint can
cost churches their distinctive traditions and values, and eventually suppress
them altogether or force their assimilation into secular society."
There are any number of ways to discriminate against religious beliefs
and practices through neutral, generally applicable laws.78 A facially neutral
law forbidding the use of hallucinogenic drugs, then, is valid even though its
effect as applied to Native Americans is to prohibit them from practicing the
central sacramental rite of their church. Shortly after Smith, the Court let
stand a state court ruling which held that a seminary student had a contract
right to a ministerial degree, even though the school had found him unfit for
moral or spiritual reasons.79 In the event of a military draft, conscientious
objectors may lose exemptions which are based on religious convictions.
Neutral laws forbidding employment discrimination could be used to require
churches to change their hiring practices to conform with secular law rather
than religious doctrine. A state could demand its teaching hospitals to instruct medical students in the abortion procedure to maintain accreditation,
which would then require church supported medical schools to violate their
religiously motivated pro-life convictions or shut down. The ruling has already been used in state courts in attempts to prevent churches from making
changes to their buildings."0

order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of civil society." WILLS, supra, at 376, citing to
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (William T. Hutchinson ed., 1962); see McConnell, supra note 20, at
1453.
75. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
76. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 411, 412 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Brennan makes a similar point in
a later free exercise case, remarking on both the "critical function" of the First Amendment, and the role
of the Court in safeguarding religious freedom. The purpose of both is to protect the rights of adherents of
minority faiths against the "quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs
and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Laycock, supra note 57, at 56. To illustrate how the coercive effects of generally applicable laws
can lead to forced assimilation, Laycock notes that the Mormon church eventually changed its doctrine to
conform with the demands of secular society, but only after years of persecution and conflict. Id. at 29.
78. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 66, at 1141-44 & nn. 139-50. Professor McConnell suggests that
if the Court presents a "parade of horribles" for one side of the argument, it should in fairness also present
the parade for the other. The "parade" is simply the "slippery slope" argument by another name. Id. Justice O'Connor states in her opinion the Court has always managed to balance societal needs against requests for exemptions in the past. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
79. Babcock v. New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 554 So. 2d 90 (La. Ct. App. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990).
80. Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); First Covenant

CASE COMMENT

The above list is by no means exhaustive. While few exemptions were
actually granted under the Sherbert standard, judicial recourse for the discriminatory effects of a law was available. Free exercise cases have almost
invariably involved generally applicable laws which were facially neutral but
which had a discriminatory effect as applied to believers of a particular
faith."' Requests for exemptions were often not granted either because the
burden as presented by the believer did not rise to the threshold, or more
often because the Court found the state's interest was sufficiently compelling
to override it. 2 The difficulty with free exercise claims had been that the
Court had not defined a clear standard to delineate the burden threshold nor
the level of state interest necessary to outweigh the burden. After Lyng, the
state merely had to refrain from acts which would coerce behavior contrary
to one's religious beliefs. 3 Given the current Court's tendency to defer to
the government, the state interest side of the equation is fairly low. The
believer's burden after Smith is to show legislative discrimination.
The Court has long struggled with the proper treatment of religious believers in a religiously pluralistic and predominantly secular society. The
Reynolds Court aptly phrased its task as finding the "true distinction between

Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). Boston wanted to declare the interior of a church a
historic landmark and dictate the location of the altar. Seattle attempted to prevent a church from changing
the outside appearance of the church building by installing new doors. In each of these cases, the state
supreme courts found a higher level of protection for the churches in the state constitutions.
81. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor argues elsewhere that free
exercise values are promoted when government lifts the burdens it has imposed on religious practice. She
also states that an "accommodation" analysis would help reconcile the standards which the Court applies
in Free Exercise and Establishment clause cases. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring). While a "distinct jurisprudence" has developed for each clause, their original common purpose
was to secure religious liberty. Id. at 68.
82. There have been few successful challenges under the Free Exercise Clause; the Court itself counts
only the Sherbert line. See Lupu, supra note 69. This may be a result of the Court's somewhat inconsistent approach to religion cases and its consequent "watered down" application of the compelling interest
test. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. Another factor is the infrequency with which the Court accepts Free Exercise
cases and its failure in those cases it does take to "coherently articulate criteria" for the exemptions it does
grant. Pepper, supra note 57, at 302. Confusion may also be attributable to the Court's generally broad
interpretation of the Establishment Clause and its relatively narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause.
These two provisions are often seen as mutually exclusive rather than complementary. See McConnell,
supra note 70 passim. Justice Stewart recognized the problem with the Court's approach to religion cases
in Sherbert, in which he said that the Court showed a "distressing insensitivity" to the appropriate demands of a constitutional guarantee with an approach that was "positively wooden." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
413-14. He foresaw a "head-on collision" between the Court's interpretation of the two religion clauses.
Id.
83. In an article primarily examining the Lyng decision and its impact on First Amendment jurisprudence, Professor Lupu makes a prescient observation which anticipates the Smith decision quite accurately.
The law which emerged from Lyng "creates an intolerable risk of discrimination against unconventional
religious practices and beliefs, and threatens to narrow the protection of religious liberty overall." Lupu,
supra note 69, at 936. It is only a short step of logic after substituting coercion for the compelling interest
test to revert to the rational basis standard. With such a presumption in favor of the government, there is
little recourse no matter how much weight is given to the substantiality of the burden.
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what properly belongs to the church and what to the state."' While few
would seriously argue that there should be no restraints on religiously motivated conduct, as such a course would lead to anarchy, there is a clear text
constitutional requirement not to prohibit the free exercise of religion. The
task then for the Court has been to achieve the appropriate level of accommodation of religious beliefs without doing violence to societal norms or
appearing to favor a religion, thus running afoul of the Establishment Clause.
The First Amendment makes religious free exercise a specifically enumerated
right, rather than a legislative grant. When one remembers the considerable
role of religion in the history of the nation, and its continuing importance to
many today, safeguarding the right of free exercise must extend beyond mere
facial neutrality. One should not need to combine one substantive constitutional right with another to be afforded judicial protection. It is only appropriate, then, that the Court strictly scrutinize laws which have an effect of
restricting religiously motivated conduct to ensure that the benefit to society
outweighs the burden to religion. The Court seemed to have found an appropriate balancing test in Sherbert and yet began to back away from it in Lyng.
It abandoned the effort altogether in Smith. 5
Karen T. White

84. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163.
85. In November 1993, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was signed into law. The Act overturned that part of Smith which reduced the standard of review and restored the compelling interest test.
Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A18.
However, the practical effect of the Act remains to be seen as the Court has been unreceptive to most free
exercise claims. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. See also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-7, at 1194 (1988) (noting that the Court has "placed significant hurdles in the
way of free exercise claimants").

